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Abstract
The design of the income transfer program for the lower incomes is a hot issue in current
public policy debate. Should we stick to a generous welfare state with a sizeable basic
income, but high marginal tax rates for the lower incomes and thus little incentives to
work? Or, should we “make work pay” by subsidizing the work of low earners, but
possibly at the cost of a smaller safety net? We think it is diﬃcult to answer this question
without making clear what individuals are (held) responsible for and what not. First, we
present a new fair allocation, coined a Pareto Eﬃcient and Shared resources Equivalent
allocation (PESE), which compensates for diﬀerent productive skills, but not for diﬀerent
tastes for working. We also characterize a fair social ordering, which rationalizes the PESE
allocation. Second, we illustrate the optimal second-best allocation in a discrete Stiglitz
(1982, 1987) economy. The question whether we should have regressive or progressive
taxes for the low earners crucially depends on whether the low-skilled have a strictly
positive or zero skill. Third, we simulate fair taxes for a sample of Belgian singles. Our
simulation results suggest that “making work pay” policies can be optimal, according to
our fairness criterion, but only in the unreasonable case in which most of the unemployed
are not willing to work.
JEL Classification: D63, H21.
Keywords: make work pay, optimal income taxation, fairness.
1 Motivation
Focussing on the tax-benefit system as a whole, many European countries combine a size-
able basic income with high marginal taxes for the low income earners. These programs are
praised for their redistributional appeal, directing the largest possible transfer towards the
poorest in society. But, at the same time, critics have held these schemes responsible for large
unemployment traps, because they do not provide incentives to (start) work(ing). Therefore,
some continental European countries –such as Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands– have proposed and/or introduced tax credit schemes recently, to subsidize
the low income earners; see Bernardi and Profeta (2004) for an overview. At the same time,
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the US and the UK, with a much longer tradition in tax credit schemes, have reinforced the
role of their tax credits. The increased policy interest for such “making work pay” schemes
is its ability to tackle two problems at the same time. It has a positive eﬀect on employment
(the number of people working and, to a lesser extent, the aggregate labour hours), while it
increases the income of poor households; see Pearson and Scarpetta (2000) for an overview.
While “making work pay” schemes may attain desirable objectives, it is not clear whether it
is also optimal to “make work pay” for a given budget constraint. The “welfarist” optimal
income tax literature consists of three canonical models, depending on whether labour supply
responses are modelled intensively and/or extensively (Heckman, 1993). First, in a Mirrlees
(1971) economy, individuals respond via the intensive margin, i.e., by varying their labour
hours or eﬀort. Marginal taxes should be non-negative everywhere (Mirrlees, 1971), which
excludes the possibility of subsidizing work. At the bottom, the marginal tax has to be zero,
but only in case everybody works (Seade, 1977). Once there exists an atom of non-workers,
the marginal tax rate has to be positive (Ebert, 1992) and, according to some numerical
simulations (Tuomala, 1990), rather high. Using the empirical earnings distribution, high
and decreasing marginal taxes at the bottom seem to survive (Diamond, 1998, Kanbur and
Tuomala, 1994, Piketty, 1997 and Saez, 2001). To conclude, in a Mirrlees economy, high
marginal tax rates at the bottom seem optimal. Second, in Diamond’s (1980) approach,
individuals respond via the extensive margin, i.e., they choose to work or not. Marginal
tax rates can be negative, suggesting at least the possibility of subsidizing the work of low
earners. Third, Saez (2002) presents a unifying framework where individuals can respond
via both margins. Support for one of both income transfer schemes depends on the relative
importance of both response margins and on the redistributive tastes of government. Saez’
benchmark simulation suggests a sizeable basic income (around $7300/year), but, combined
with a tax exemption at the bottom (for incomes up to $5000/year).
In the same year of Mirrlees’ (1971) seminal contribution, Rawls (1971) criticizes the wel-
farist approach. In the aftermath of Rawls’ influential work, many alternative theories of
distributive justice were proposed. Although very diverse in equalisandum, they almost all
have Dworkin’s (1981) cut in common. Dworkin claims that not all individual characteris-
tics can (should) be considered as morally arbitrary. Therefore one has to make a clear cut
between endowments and ambitions. He introduces personal responsibility: individuals are
responsible for their ambitions –as long as they identify with them– but not for their en-
dowments. As a consequence, a fair distribution scheme should be ambition-sensitive, but
endowment-insensitive.
In an optimal income tax setting, fairness could require to compensate for diﬀerences in pro-
ductive skill (endowment), but not for diﬀerences in taste for working (ambition).1 Schokkaert
et al. (2004) introduce such fairness considerations in diﬀerent ways and calculate the corre-
sponding optimal linear income tax, which turns out to be positive. Allowing for non-linear
tax schemes, results change drastically. Boadway et al. (2002) analyze the optimal non-linear
income tax according to a weighted utilitarian or maximin social planner where diﬀerent
weights are chosen for diﬀerent tastes. Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2002) characterize a fair
social ordering to analyze non-linear income taxes. In both studies, negative marginal taxes
(for the low income earners) may be optimal.
In the next section we present a new fair allocation, coined a Pareto Eﬃcient and Shared re-
sources Equivalent (PESE) allocation. As the name suggests, the optimal allocation is Pareto
1Roemer et al. (2001) consider the education level of the parents as the compensating variable.
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eﬃcient and all individuals are indiﬀerent between their bundle and what they would get if it
were physically possible to divide or share all resources, including the productive skills. Sec-
tion 3 characterizes a fair social ordering, which rationalizes the PESE allocation. In section
4, we introduce a “discrete” Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy with (i) four types of individuals
(defined by a low or high productive skill and a low or high taste for working) and (ii) a
government who wants to install fair taxes, but cannot observe individuals’ type. We show
that fairness recommends regressive taxation for the low earners, as long as the low-skilled
individuals have a strictly positive skill. In case the low-skilled have a zero skill, only pro-
gressive taxes can be optimal. In section 5, we simulate fair taxes for Belgian singles, while
carefully paying attention to the calibration of the compensation (hourly wages) and respon-
sibility (taste for working) variable. Our simulation results suggest that “making work pay”
policies can be optimal –according to our fairness criterion– but only in the unreasonable
case in which most of the unemployed are not willing to work.
2 Equality of resources revisited
When all resources in society are alienable and divisible, Dworkin proposes to divide resources
equally (endowment insensitivity), followed by an auction to reallocate resources according
to taste (ambition sensitivity). This leads to a Pareto eﬃcient and envy-free allocation. To
study fair income taxation, however, we have to introduce productive resources (skills), which
are not alienable, and therefore a problem arises. In production economies, Pareto eﬃcient
and envy-free allocations do not exist, in general.
A first class of solutions tries to extend the above Dworkinian auction by assigning property
rights over leisure. Varian (1974) analyzes two, rather extreme, solutions. One may divide
consumption goods equally and either (i) assign each individual his own leisure, or (ii) give
each individual an equal share in each of the agents’ (including his own) leisure time. After
trade, the resulting competitive (and hence Pareto eﬃcient) equilibria are called respectively
(i) wealth-fair and (ii) income-fair. In the wealth-fair allocation, productive talents are a
private good and the resulting allocation does not compensate at all for inabilities. In the
income-fair allocation, productive talents are a public good. The high-skilled has to buy back
his expensive leisure and is therefore punished for being a high skill type, resulting in a slavery
of the talented. Intermediate solutions exist where skills are neither purely private, nor purely
public (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 1996, Maniquet, 1998).
A second class of solutions starts from the concept of fair-equivalence. Pazner and Schmeidler
(1978) define an allocation to be fair-equivalent if everyone is indiﬀerent between his bundle
in this allocation and the bundle he would receive in a “hypothetical” fair, i.e., envy-free,
allocation. It then suﬃces to define an interesting “hypothetical” fair allocation and to look
whether there exist Pareto eﬃcient ones, among all fair-equivalent allocations. The resulting
allocation is called a Pareto eﬃcient and fair-equivalent (PEFE) allocation.
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) propose an egalitarian allocation –an allocation where every-
body consumes the same consumption-leisure bundle– as the fair one, which leads to Pareto
eﬃcient and egalitarian-equivalent (PEEE) allocations. We propose a diﬀerent fair allocation,
which we coin a “shared resources” allocation. This is the allocation which would result, if it
were (physically) possible to divide or share all resources, including the productive ones. To
make this idea more precise, we introduce some notation.
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A fixed number of individuals, denoted i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, diﬀer in skills and preferences.
Skill s ∈ R+ defines production (called gross income in the sequel) in a linear way, or y = s`,
with ` ∈ [0, 1] the amount of labour. We denote a skill profile by s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn+. Taste
for working is represented by a continuously diﬀerentiable utility function
U : R× [0, 1]→ R : (c, `) 7→ U (c, `) ,
which is strictly increasing (resp. strictly decreasing) in consumption c (resp. labour `) and
strictly quasi-concave. We call U the corresponding set of utility functions and, normalizing
the consumption price equal to one, we refer to c as the net income in the sequel. A utility
profile is denoted by U = (U1, . . . , Un) ∈ Un. An economy e = (s,U) is completely defined
by a skill and a utility profile; all economies are gathered in a set E = Rn+ × Un.
Individuals are (held) responsible for their tastes, but not for their skills. Therefore, we want
to compensate individuals for diﬀerent outcomes which are only due to diﬀerent skills, but
not for diﬀerent outcomes which are only caused by diﬀerent tastes for working. In case skills
are alienable –think, e.g., of individuals as farmers who receive, as a matter of brute bad
luck, either a blunt or a whetted scythe (the skill s) to harvest crops (the consumption c)–
there is a particularly simple and attractive way to obtain a fair allocation:
(a). each individual pays (or receives) the same lump-sum amount of money,
(b). each individual can use each skill (including his own) for a time equal to
1
n at most.
As such, all individuals would end up with the same opportunity set. In the sequel, we call this
opportunity set the “shared resources” opportunity set and the resulting allocation (which
ultimately depend on the tastes in society) is called the “shared resources” allocation.
To illustrate these concepts, suppose (i) there are only two skill types possible in society,
say low (L) and high (H), which are equally represented in the skill pool s, and (ii) there
are only two tastes for working possible, also called low (L) and high (H). An allocation
z = (zLL, zLH , zHL, zHH) contains one bundle zst = (cst, `st) for each of the four types st,
with s referring to the skill (low or high) and t referring to the taste (low or high). Figure 1
illustrates the opportunity sets and (resulting) allocations in case (a) each individual receives
the same lump-sum amount of money a, but productive resources are not shared, and (a)+(b)
each individuals receives the same lump-sum amount a and also the productive resources are
shared (each individual can work with each of the skills half-time at most).
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Figure 1: Opportunity set/allocation change when sharing productive resources.
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Sharing productive resources is not technically feasible in many cases. Labour market pro-
ductivities, due to inborn characteristics such as intelligence, talents, handicaps and so on, are
typically inalienable. Still, we could consider the allocation, which would arise if it were possi-
ble to divide and share all resources equally, as an interesting “hypothetical” case. However,
the resulting hypothetical “shared resources” allocation is not Pareto eﬃcient, in general.
Therefore, we propose to focus on Pareto Eﬃcient and Shared resources Equivalent (PESE)
allocations. Figure 2 illustrates a PESE allocation for an economy defined by the same as-
sumptions (i) and (ii) as in figure 1. Given the skill and preference technology, there exists a
unique PESE allocation for each value of a.
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Figure 2: A Pareto eﬃcient and shared resources equivalent allocation.
3 A “shared resources” social ordering
In case it is possible to recognize the less from the more productive and the lazy from the
hard-working individuals, we can choose among all Pareto eﬃcient and “shared resources”
equivalent allocations described in the previous section. However, it is not always possible to
observe types. To proceed in such a second-best setting, it is more convenient to characterize
a corresponding “shared resources” social ordering.
We define our well-being concept, which is closely linked to the PESE allocation. Let Z =
(R× [0, 1])n be the set of allocations z = (zi)i∈N , containing one bundle zi = (ci, `i) for each
individual i in N . We get (an explanation follows):
well-being: For each allocation z ∈ Z, the vector of well-being levels w =
(wi)i∈N ∈ Rn is defined by the amounts of money wi which would make individual
i indiﬀerent between (i) receiving (or paying) this amount of money wi and sharing
all productive resources equally (in time), and (ii) his actual bundle xi. Because
the well-being vector w depends on the allocation z and the economy e = (s,U),
we write w =W (z, e), with wi =Wi (z, e).
A few observations need to be stressed here. First, for the PESE allocation presented in figure
2, the well-being levels are the same for all individuals and equal to a. More general, in any
“shared resources” equivalent allocation, individuals end up with the same well-being and, vice
versa, if all individuals have the same well-being in an allocation, the latter must be “shared
resources” equivalent. Second, well-being has to be interpreted as a “relative” measure of fair
treatment, in the spirit of the PESE allocation. If two individuals have the same well-being,
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they have been treated equally fair, because both individuals are indiﬀerent between their
actual bundle and the bundle they would choose if (a) they receive the same lump-sum amount
of money and (b) all productive resources are shared equally. If one individual has a strictly
lower well-being compared to another, he has been treated unfair with respect to the other,
because both individuals are indiﬀerent between their actual bundle and the bundle they
would choose if (b) all productive resources are shared equally, but (a) the former individual
receives a strictly lower lump-sum amount of money. Third, higher utility (and thus a higher
indiﬀerence curve) also leads to a higher well-being level. As such, our definition of well-being
corresponds with one specific, but, according to us, interesting cardinalization of the utility
functions.
A rule f maps economies into orderings, or f : E → R : e 7→ Re = f (e), with R the set of
all orderings (complete and transitive binary relations) defined over allocations z in Z; call
Pe and Ie the corresponding asymmetric and symmetric relation. We define some properties
for f . Our Pareto principle is equal to Pareto Indiﬀerence and the Weak Pareto principle
together, i.e., if everyone is indiﬀerent between allocations z and z
0
, then z should also be
socially indiﬀerent to z
0
and if everyone strictly prefers allocation z to z
0
, then z should also
be socially strictly preferred to z
0
. Anonimity requires that the names of the individuals do
not matter. Formally:
Pareto: For each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z: If Ui (zi) =
Ui
³
z
0
i
´
for all i ∈ N , then zIez
0
. If, Ui (zi) > Ui
³
z
0
i
´
for all i ∈ N , then zPez
0
.
Anonimity: For each economy e ∈ E , for each allocation z ∈ Z and for each
permutation π : N → N over individuals: If Ui = Uj for all i, j ∈ N , then zIeπ (z),
with π (z) =
¡
zπ(1), . . . , zπ(n)
¢
.
In line with the idea to compensate for diﬀerences in outcomes which are only due to diﬀer-
ences in skills, compensation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2002) requires that a Pigou-Dalton
transfer (in terms of net income) from a rich to a poor individual with the same preferences
and the same labour should be welfare improving:
Compensation: For each economy e ∈ E , for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z and for all
individuals i, j ∈ N : If (i) `i = `j , `
0
i = `
0
j and Ui = Uj , (ii) ∃δ > 0 such that
c
0
i = ci + δ < cj − δ = c
0
j and (iii) zk = z
0
k for all k 6= i, j, then zRz
0
.
Finally, in line with (i) our well-being definition and (ii) the idea that individuals are respon-
sible for their tastes, Well-being Independence requires the ranking of two allocations to be
the same (i) whenever they give rise to the same well-being vector, (ii) irrespective of the
utility profile:
Well-being Independence: For all economies e = (s,U) , e
0
=
³
s,U
0´ ∈ E and
for all allocations z, z
0 ∈ Z: IfW (z, e) =W
³
z, e
0
´
andW
³
z
0
, e
´
=W
³
z
0
, e
0
´
,
then zRez
0 ⇔ zRe0z
0
.
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Given these axioms, we should focus on the minimal well-being in society, or:2
Proposition 1. If a rule f : E → R satisfies Pareto, Anonimity, Compensation and
Well-being Independence, then, for each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z:
minW (z, e) > minW
³
z
0
, e
´
implies zPez
0
.
The “shared resources” social ordering has some formal similarity with Fleurbaey and Mani-
quet’s (2000) es-implicit budget leximin function, where es is a reference skill level. In our case,
the reference skill es is piece-wise linear and endogenously defined by the skill pool in society.
As such, laissez-faire allocations are selected in case all individuals have the same skill.
4 Fair taxes: theory
In the previous section, we characterize a fair social ordering, inspired by the PESE allocation.
In this section, we analyze what happens when the government uses this fair social ordering
to calculate optimal taxes in a discrete Stiglitz economy (1982, 1987) with four types, which
are not observable to the government.
All individuals in N = {1, . . . , n} can have four types, denoted (s, t) ∈ S × T , where s is
the skill level and t the taste for working; we abbreviate types as st ∈ ST . Each type st
is represented by nst > 0 individuals, with n =
P
st∈ST nst. Skills can be low or high, or
s ∈ S = {L,H}, with 0 < L < H; later on, we come back to the issue of zero skills. Tastes
for working can also be low or high, or t ∈ {L,H}, which correspond with a utility function
Ut.
3
As before, utility functions belong to U , but we impose some additional properties. Let Vst
represent the preferences in the consumption-income space for type st, more precisely Vst :
R × [0, s] → R : (c, y) 7→ Vst (c, y) ≡ Ut
¡
c, ys
¢
.4 We impose two additional properties on the
utility functions Ut; see Stiglitz (1982, 1987) for the first and Boadway et al. (2002) for the
second property:
Single-crossingness: A higher taste for working t corresponds with a lower
marginal rate of substitution (denoted MRSt = −∂Ut/∂`∂Ut/∂c), expressing the view
that individuals with a higher taste for working require less compensation (in
terms of net income c) to work a little bit longer. Formally: MRSL > MRSH in
R× [0, 1].
Indistinguishable middle type: The types LH and HL have the same pref-
erences in the consumption-income space. Formally, there exists a continuous and
strictly increasing function φ : R→ R, such that VLH = φ ◦ VHL in R× [0, L].
Both assumptions together, the marginal rates of substitution in consumption-income space
(denoted MRSYst = −∂Vst/∂y∂Vst/∂c ) are also single-crossing, more precisely:
2All proofs can be found in appendix A.
3The exact scalars do not matter here, so we stick to the notation of L to denote low taste for working
and/or low-skilled and H > L to denote high taste for working and/or high-skilled.
4Whenever s = 0, we define Vst (c, y) = c for all (c, y) ∈ R× {0}.
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MRSYLL > MRSYLH =MRSYHL > MRSYHH , in R× [0, L] and
MRSYHL > MRSYHH in R× [L,H].
We focus in the sequel on allocations x = (xLL, xLH , xHL, xHH) in consumption-income space,
thus x ∈ X = (R× [0, L])2×(R× [0,H])2, containing one bundle xst = (cst, yst) for each type
st ∈ ST . The program of the government is to find the best allocation(s) x–“best” according
to the fair social ordering defined in proposition 1– subject to (i) incentive compatibility
constraints (no type envies another type’s bundle) and (ii) a feasibility constraint (the sum of
all taxes is larger than the government requirement g ∈ R). Recall our definition of well-being
in the previous section; with a slight abuse of notation, we write the well-being of type st in
allocation x as wst =Wst (x). We get:
max
x∈X
min
st∈ST
(Wst (x))st∈ST subject to (∗)
incentive compatibility constraints IC
st,(st)
0 :
Vst (xst) ≥ Vst
³
x
(st)
0
´
,∀st ∈ {H} × T,∀ (st)0 ∈ ST,
Vst (xst) ≥ Vst
³
x
(st)
0
´
,∀st ∈ {L} × T,∀ (st)0 ∈ ST with y
(st)
0 ≤ L.
feasibility constraint: X
st∈ST
nst (yst − cst) ≥ g.
Our first result tells us that the lowest income type, the “undeserving poor” with type LL,
must always receive less subsidies (or pay higher taxes) than the second lowest income type,
the “hard-working poor” with type LH. This result suggests that it is optimal –according
to our fair social ordering– to “make work pay” by subsidizing the low earners:
Proposition 2 . Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes represented
by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable mid-
dle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined by ( ∗). In an optimal
allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL − c∗LL ≥ y∗LH − c∗LH .
We have to put this result in perspective, however. Although it is reasonable to assume that
all individuals (with a capacity for work) have strictly positive productive skills, individuals
might be constrained in their choice due to labour market frictions. Minimum wage laws,
rationing and so on, may prevent individuals, in particular the low-skilled, from working.
Suppose, in our four type economy, that the low-skilled individuals, are willing, but cannot
work, due to such constraints, which are beyond their responsibility. In such a case, their skills
are nullified. This turns proposition 2 round, or, taxes must be progressive for the bottom
incomes:
Proposition 3. Consider a four type economy with skills L = 0 < H and tastes represented
by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable mid-
dle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined by ( ∗). In an optimal
allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL − c∗LL = y∗LH − c∗LH ≤ y∗HL − c∗HL.
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Both proposition 2 and 3 are based on simple fictitious economies. Furthermore, in proposition
3 we consider a rather extreme case in which all unemployed (the low-skilled) are not able to
work. In the next section, we simulate fair taxes for a sample of Belgian singles. It allows us
to focus on (i) more realistic economies with many diﬀerent types and, more importantly, on
(ii) diﬀerent and more realistic scenarios concerning the ability of the unemployed to work.
The diﬀerent scenarios in (ii) have a crucial impact on the tax-benefit scheme for the low
earners.
5 Fair taxes: simulation results
5.1 Calibration
We use a sample of singles from the 1997 wave of the Panel Study for Belgian Households;
we only include singles with a capacity for work (students, pensioners, sick, or handicapped
singles are excluded). We observe (i) the pre-tax yearly labour income y, (ii) the amount of
labour `, normalized such that 0 ≤ ` ≤ 1, where ` = 1 corresponds with 2925 hours, i.e., 45
weeks times 65 hours, (iii) the gross hourly wage rate σ (only observed for those who worked,
i.e., both y, ` 6= 0) which leads to a gross yearly wage rate s = 2925σ and (iv) the total net
unemployment benefit β (only observed for those who were partly or completely unemployed
in 1997) from which we derive the net yearly unemployment benefit b = β1−` , i.e., the net
unemployment benefit one would obtain if full-time unemployed (` = 0).
First, we consider all individuals for which we possess all of the above information. We con-
sider quasi-linear preferences (which excludes income eﬀects) represented by utility functions:5
Ut : R× [0, 1]→ R : (c, `) 7→ Ut (c, `) = c− 1
t
ε
1 + ε
`
1+ε
ε ,
with t the taste parameter (possibly diﬀerent for diﬀerent individuals) and ε the labour supply
elasticity (the same for all individuals). Preferences in consumption-income space become:
Vst : R× [0, s]→ R : (c, y) 7→ Vst (c, y) = c− 1
s
1+ε
ε t
ε
1 + ε
y
1+ε
ε .
The net income of a Belgian single equals y − τ97(y) + b(1 − ys ), with τ97(·) the actual tax
system for singles in Belgium in 1997 (reported in appendix B) and b(1− ys ) the benefit when
working ` = ys units of time. Both tax and benefit parts separately, as well as the resulting
budget set (the solid line), are illustrated in figure 3.
5Due to quasi-linearity, other non-labour income (e.g., due to rents, gifts, alimony, child allowances) does
not matter for the labour choice of an individual. Furthermore, we assume that non-labour income falls within
the responsiblity of an individual and it is therefore excluded from our analysis.
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Figure 3: Calibration of the taste parameter t.
We calibrate t such that the choice of y is rationalized for each single. More precisely, the
slope of the individual’s budget set at y, denoted h (y), should be equal to the marginal rate
of substitution between consumption and gross income for the quasi-linear preferences Vst;
we get6
t =
1
s
1
h (y)
³y
s
´ 1
ε
, with h (y) = 1− τ 097(y)−
b
s
.
Second, since we could only observe gross yearly wages s (resp. net yearly unemployment
benefits b) for individuals who worked in 1997 (resp. individuals who received unemployment
benefits in 1997), we complete our dataset by imputing values for s and b, whenever unob-
served, via a Heckman selection model. Thus, in estimating s and b, we correct for a possible
sample selection bias, due to the fact that we only observe wages s for those who worked and
benefits b for those who were (permanently or temporarily) unemployed. The variables used
for the imputation as well as the estimation results are described in appendix C.
We end up with a heterogeneous sample of 621 singles who diﬀer in skills s and tastes t, which
drive their labour market behaviour; appendix D contains some descriptive statistics for our
dataset. Two points are worth mentioning here. First, the non-responsibility parameter s
and the responsibility parameter t in our dataset are barely correlated: using a low labour
supply elasticity ε = 0.1 for singles, the correlation between s and t equals −0.071, suggesting
independently distributed skills and tastes. With a strong correlation, compensating for skills
only (and not for tastes) would be a dubious exercise. Second, given the nature of our quasi-
linear preferences, all unemployed individuals receive a taste for working t = 0. To put it
diﬀerently, all unemployed are considered unwilling to work. We relax this crucial assumption
later on.
5.2 Results
Rather than using allocations as in the government program (∗), we use a piece-wise linear
tax-benefit scheme as our instrument to approximate a non-linear tax scheme. As we are
mainly concerned with the bottom incomes, we consider a piecewise linear tax-benefit scheme
6Requiring t > 0, individuals with h ≤ 0 were dropped out of the sample (17 observations).
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up to yearly gross earnings of 20000 in steps of 500 and we use a constant marginal tax
rate afterwards. Using either a wider range of piecewise linear taxes (up to 80000 in steps
of 500) or a finer grid (up to 20000 in steps of 250) does not change our results for
the bottom incomes drastically. Remarkably, using a wider range leads to approximately
constant marginal tax rates for incomes above 20000, with the exception of the very high
incomes. Given such a tax-benefit scheme, individuals choose their best bundle (according to
their tastes and skills) and, therefore, incentive constraints are not necessary anymore. For
the feasibility constraint, we use the total government requirement (g) in the actual system,
which is (in per capita terms) equal to 3851.
5.2.1 The benchmark simulation
No income eﬀects and a low labour supply elasticity do not seem unrealistic for singles; see,
e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an empirical assessment. Using a labour supply elas-
ticity ε = 0.1 as a benchmark (BM), figure 4 depicts the chosen bundles in the consumption-
gross income space; the dotted line does not represent an optimal tax-benefit schedule, but
is only connecting the chosen consumption-gross income bundles. We also report (i) how the
benchmark allocation changes when adding participation constraints (BM+PC), i.e., everyone
prefers his bundle rather than not participating and receiving the bundle (0, 0), and (ii) the
Rawlsian optimal allocation, i.e., the one which maximizes the basic income (RAWLS). Our
benchmark simulation (BM) is rather extreme, with a negative (yearly) basic income of —
16067, very strong subsidies as soon as individuals start working (up to gross incomes equal
to 3000), a progressive part for gross incomes between 3000 and 9500, a small regressive
part again for incomes between 9500 and 11500 and progressive taxes afterwards. Adding
participation constraints (BM+PC), we obtain a low (yearly) basic income equal to 518,
moderate subsidies fading in around 3000 and fading out around 11500, followed by pro-
gressive taxes. The Rawlsian case installs a positive basic income equal to 9363 and high
positive marginal tax rates for the bottom incomes.
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Figure 4: Optimal allocation for the benchmark and the Rawlsian case.
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Table 1 summarizes for all schemes and for diﬀerent groups of individuals G (i) the proportion
of individuals |G|n and (ii) the average tax rate (
1
|G|
P
i∈G (yi − ci)).
G y = 0 0 < y ≤ 10000 10000 < y ≤ 20000 20000 < y
proportion 0.19 0.09 0.36 0.36
BM
avg. tax 16067 −3951 −3765 6955
proportion 0.19 0.11 0.41 0.29
BM+PC
avg. tax −518 −1321 561 13104
proportion 0.21 0.14 0.40 0.25
RAWLS
avg. tax −9363 −4206 5849 15856
Table 1: Some characteristics for the benchmark and the Rawlsian case.
5.2.2 The impact of ε
In our benchmark simulation, the labour supply elasticity ε equals 0.1. Using a lower ε = 0.05,
the correlation between s and t equals -0.049, while for a higher ε = 0.2, the correlation
between s and t becomes -0.075. Figure 5 shows the limited impact of varying ε (0.05, 0.1,
0.2) on our optimal allocation. The sequence of regressive and progressive parts turns out to
be rather robust to the labour supply elasticity.
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Figure 5: Measuring the impact of varying ε.
5.2.3 What about choice constraints?
As far, individuals who do not work (y = 0) are all modelled as individuals who do not want
to work (t = 0). This is clearly an extreme viewpoint. For example, minimum wage laws in
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Belgium could keep some individuals (especially those with low skills s) from working and,
therefore, our calibration might underestimate their true taste parameter t, thus overestimat-
ing their well-being level w. More reasonably, at least some of the observed unemployment
must be involuntary, especially in the case of singles. We consider two, rather conservative
cases: unemployment is voluntary for the unemployed with either the 90% highest (90%) or
the 75% highest (75%) productivities. The results change dramatically.
We proceed as follows. First, we assign (as a start value) to each constrained individual
a taste parameter t in the neighbourhood of the average taste parameter of the working
and minimize the overall correlation between skills and tastes by deviating from these start
values. Afterwards, we keep these individuals constrained at y = 0, but use their “true”
taste parameter to calculate well-being levels.7 Figure 6 presents the benchmark case (BM)
–which represents the extreme case where all unemployment is voluntary– together with the
90%- and the 75%-case –where respectively 90% and 75% of the unemployment is voluntary
(for those with the higher productivities)– as well as the Rawlsian (RAWLS) case, which
maximizes the basic income.
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Figure 6: Measuring the impact of constraints.
It clearly shows that taking choice constraints into account dramatically alters our fair tax-
benefit scheme. The 90%-case installs a basic income equal to 1631, but it is still followed by
a small regressive region (around 5000 - 10000), whereas the 75%-case already leads to a
progressive tax-benefit scheme with a basic income equal to 6931 and rather high marginal
taxes for the bottom incomes.
7As we do not know whether it is technically possible to alleviate these constraints, we stick to tax instru-
ments to maximize the minimal well-being.
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6 Conclusion
Given the increased importance many governments attach to ”making work pay” policies,
we examine whether subsidizing low earners is optimal according to a specific “fair” social
ordering. Fairness considerations are kept simple in this paper: we want to compensate
individuals for diﬀerences in productive skills, but we keep them responsible for their tastes
for working.
In a discrete Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy with four types, optimal taxes crucially depend
on the low skill level. Taxes should always be regressive for the bottom incomes –to improve
the situation of the worst-oﬀ, the hard-working “deserving” poor– unless the low-skilled
have zero skills. Although it is reasonable to assume that all individuals with a capacity for
work have strictly positive skills, labour market frictions –such as minimum wage laws and
job rationing– may nullify their skills. As a consequence, “making work pay” schemes are
optimal, only if individuals are unconstrained when making labour choices.
Our simulation results, calibrated on a sample of Belgian singles, illustrate the crucial issue
again: are individuals and, more specifically, the unemployed, truly responsible for their
labour choices? If all unemployment is voluntary, “making work pay” schemes are optimal.
However, this assumption is hardly plausible. If only a small number of unemployed have
similar tastes for working as the employed, but cannot work due to constraints (beyond their
responsibility), the optimal tax-benefit scheme changes drastically. More precisely, it moves
quickly from a low basic income and high subsidies for the bottom incomes towards a sizeable
basic income combined with high marginal taxes for the low earners. The crucial question
–the percentage of the unemployed who are willing, but unable to work– is ultimately
an empirical issue. Meanwhile, since conservative low estimates change our results rapidly
towards a high basic income and high marginal taxes for the bottom incomes, we believe that
the latter, rather than making work pay schemes, should be given the benefit of the doubt.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1
If a rule f : E → R satisfies Pareto, Anonimity, Compensation and Well-being Independence,
then, for each e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z: minW (z, e) > minW
³
z
0
, e
´
⇒ zPez
0
.
Proof.
First, we show, in three steps, that Pareto Indiﬀerence (the first part of the Pareto axiom)
and Well-being Independence for f are equivalent with Neutrality for f :
Neutrality: For all economies e = (s,U), e
0
=
³
s,U
0
´
∈ E and for all allocations
a,b, c,d ∈ Z: If W (a, e) =W
³
b, e
0
´
and W (c, e) =W
³
d, e
0
´
, then aRec ⇔
bRe0d.
1. If f satisfies Neutrality then f also satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence. Suppose the antecedent
of Pareto Indiﬀerence is true for a certain economy e ∈ E and two allocations z, z0 ∈ Z, i.e.,
Ui (zi) = Ui
³
z
0
i
´
for all i ∈ N . As such, zi lies on the same indiﬀerence curve as z
0
i for all
individuals and, by definition of our well-being concept, W (z, e) = W
³
z
0
, e
´
. Let e
0
= e
and define allocations a = d = z and b = c = z
0
. As a consequence, W (a, e) =W
³
b, e
0
´
andW (c, e) =W
³
d, e
0
´
are true by construction. Using Neutrality, we get aRec⇔ bRe0d,
or equivalently, zRez
0 ⇔ z0Rez (•). Because of completeness of Re, we must have either
zRez
0
(and also z
0
Rez via (•)) or z0Rez (and also zRez0 via (•)). Both cases, lead to zIez0
establishing Pareto Indiﬀerence.
2. If f satisfies Neutrality then f also satisfies Well-being Independence. Suppose the an-
tecedent of Well-being Independence is true, i.e., there exist two economies e = (s,U) ,e
0
=³
s,U
0
´
∈ E and two allocations z, z0 ∈ Z such that W (z, e) =W
³
z, e
0
´
and W
³
z
0
, e
´
=
W
³
z
0
, e
0
´
. Simply choose a = b = z and c = d = z
0
such that W (a, e) = W
³
b, e
0
´
and W (c, e) = W
³
d, e
0
´
holds. Using Neutrality, we get aRec ⇔ bRe0d, or equivalently,
zRez
0 ⇔ zRe0z
0
establishing Well-being Independence.
3. If f satisfies Pareto Indiﬀerence and Well-being Independence then f also satisfies Neutral-
ity. Suppose the antecedent of Neutrality holds, i.e., there exist two economies e = (s,U) and
e
0
=
³
s,U
0
´
∈ E and four allocations a,b, c,d ∈ Z such that W (a, e) = W
³
b, e
0
´
and
W (c, e) = W
³
d, e
0
´
. Let us focus on an arbitrary individual i ∈ N . Because Wi (a, e) =
Wi
³
b, e
0
´
, the indiﬀerence curve of Ui through ai and U
0
i through bi are tangent to the
same “shared resources” opportunity set defined by s. Given Ui, U
0
i ∈ U , both indiﬀerence
curves must cross at least once in R × [0, 1]. Choose a bundle αi where both cross. Re-
peating this construction of αi for all individuals, we get an allocation α ∈ Z such that
W (α, e) =W (a, e) =W
³
b, e
0
´
=W
³
α, e0
´
. In the same way, define an allocation β ∈ Z
such that W (β, e) = W (c, e) = W
³
d, e
0
´
= W
³
β, e0
´
. Using Pareto Indiﬀerence and
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transitivity of Re and Re0 , we get:
(•) aRec⇔ αReβ and αRe0β ⇔ bRe0d.
UsingWell-being Independence, we getαReβ ⇔ αRe0β. Together with (•), we get aRec⇔ bRe0d,
establishing Neutrality.
Second, we show that Neutrality is equivalent with welfarism, i.e., a rule f satisfies Neutrality
if and only if there exists a unique ordering R∗ defined over Rn, such that, for each economy
e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z0 ∈ Z we have zRez0 if and only if W (z, e) R∗ W
³
z
0
, e
´
.
Here welfarism has to be interpreted as follows: only well-being levels (rather than utility
levels) matter to rank two allocations (given a fixed size n of the population and a fixed skill
vector s). Welfarism is a well-known result in the social choice literature (see Bossert and
Weymark (2004), theorem 2, for a proof). It suﬃces to notice that our set-up is suﬃciently
rich to obtain welfarism: for any two well-being vectors v,w ∈ Rn, there exist two allocations
z, z
0 ∈ Z and an economy e ∈ E such thatW (z, e) = v andW
³
z
0
, e
´
= w.
Third, the unique ordering R∗ inherits certain properties from f : R∗ must satisfy weak Pareto
(if vi>wi for all i ∈ N , then vP ∗w) and Anonimity (vI∗π (v) with π : N → N a permutation
of individuals in N). This is straightforward. We prove that R∗ must also satisfy
Hammond Equity: For all well-being vectors v,w ∈ Rn and for all individuals
i, j ∈ N : If (i) wi < vi < vj < wj and (ii) vk = wk for all k 6= i, j, then vR∗w.
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Suppose the antecedent of Hammond Equity holds, or there exist two well-being vectors
v,w ∈ Rn and two individuals i, j ∈ N such that wi < vi < vj < wj and vk = wk for all
k 6= i, j hold. The figure illustrates how it is possible to construct bundles zi, zj and z0i, z
0
j and
a utility function Ui = Uj ∈ U such thatWi (z, e) = vi,Wj (z, e) = vj andWi
³
z
0
, e
´
= wi,
Wj
³
z
0
, e
´
= wj and the antecedents of the Compensation principle are satisfied for i, j, i.e.,
(i) `i = `j , `
0
i = `
0
j and Ui = Uj (ii) ∃δ > 0 such that c
0
i = ci + δ < cj − δ = c
0
j . The bundles
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zi, zj and z
0
i, z
0
j can be extended with bundles zk = z
0
k for the other individuals k 6= i, j to
obtain allocations z and z
0
, such thatWk (z, e) = vk = wk =Wk
³
z
0
, e
´
holds for all k 6= i, j.
Using Compensation, we must have zRez
0
and thus, via welfarism, also vR∗w must hold.
Finally, Given the axioms for R∗, Tungodden (2000, theorem 1) shows that minv > minw
implies vP ∗w, for any vectors v,w ∈ Rn, which, given welfarism, completes our proof.
Proof of propositions 2 and 3
To prove propositions 2 and 3, we need two “tricks” and two lemmas. We start with the
tricks.
Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X as in figure A1. The bundles xLL
and xHH lie somewhere in the left and right shaded zone, respectively, to satisfy the in-
centive constraints. The bundle x◦ is constructed to satisfy VHL (x
◦) = VHL (xHL) and
MRSYHL (x
◦) = 1.
6
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Figure A1: the allocations x and x+ illustrating trick 1.
Now, consider the allocation x+∈X with x+st = xst for all types st 6= HL and x+HL is con-
structed by moving xHL on his indiﬀerence curve towards the bundle x◦. It is clear that
the allocation x+ is implementable. Furthermore, given the preference technology defined
by U , we have y+HL − c+HL > y∗HL − c∗HL. Thus, the allocation x+ is also feasible, withP
st∈ST nst
¡
y+st − c+st
¢
−
P
st∈ST nst (y
∗
st − c∗st) = m > 0. The amount of money m can now
be freely redistributed to the net income of all types (while still satisfying all incentive con-
straints) resulting in a weak Pareto improvement and thus also an improvement according to
the government’s program (∗). More generally, we obtain:
Trick 1: Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X and a type st
whose bundle xst can be moved along his indiﬀerence curve (i) without violating
incentive constraints and (ii) making an amount of moneym free for redistribution.
The allocation x cannot be optimal according to program (∗), because everyone
can be made strictly better-oﬀ (by redistributing the amount of money m to the
net incomes of all types), without violating incentive constraints.
To illustrate the second trick, consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X as in
figure A2.
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Figure A2: the allocation x and x+ illustrating trick 2.
Again, the bundle xHH lies somewhere in the right shaded zone to satisfy the incentive
constraints. Now it is possible to construct a feasible and implementable allocation x+∈X ,
transferring in x some net income from type LL to the other types LH,HL andHH. Whether
or not the resulting allocation is better according to program (∗), ultimately depends on the
well-being levels in society: if LL is strictly better oﬀ compared to one of the other types,
it is always possible to find an allocation x+ which is better according to program (∗). We
summarize
Trick 2: Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X and one or
more types st whose bundle(s) xst can be moved downwards (i) without violat-
ing incentive constraints and (ii) making an amount of money m > 0 free for
redistribution to the other types. The allocation x cannot be optimal according to
program (∗), if all donor type(s) st were strictly better oﬀ in x compared to (one
of) the other types.
Besides two tricks, we need two lemmas. The first lemma tells us that the program (∗) can,
loosely speaking, focus on the lower-skilled, because they are always worse-oﬀ in terms of
well-being, more precisely:
Lemma 1. Consider two types with the same taste for working t ∈ T (and thus the same
utility function Ut ∈ U), but diﬀerent skills 0 ≤ L < H. In an implementable allocation
x ∈X , with VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt) (resp. VHt (xHt) > VHt (xLt)) the lower-skilled type Lt
is always worse oﬀ (resp. strictly worse oﬀ) compared to the higher-skilled type Ht, i.e.,
WHt (x) ≥WLt (x) (resp.WHt (x) >WLt (x)).
Proof. Consider two types with the same taste for working t ∈ T . We prove the case where
skills satisfy 0 < L < T and VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt); the other cases are analogous. Call
(cLt, yLt) and (cHt, yHt) their bundles. Individuals with the same taste t have the same utility
functions Ut and thus also the same indiﬀerence curves and therefore the same well-being
level for bundles on the same indiﬀerence curve. Because our well-being measure is ordinally
equivalent with utility, measured by Ut, it suﬃces to show that Ut
¡
cLt,
yLt
L
¢
≤ Ut
¡
cHt,
yHt
H
¢
.
Suppose not, i.e., suppose (i) Ut
¡
cLt,
yLt
L
¢
> Ut
¡
cHt,
yHt
H
¢
. Because VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt) we
get, by definition of VHt, that (ii) Ut
¡
cHt,
yHt
H
¢
≥ Ut
¡
cLt,
yLt
H
¢
. Combining (i) and (ii), we
obtain Ut
¡
cLt,
yLt
L
¢
> Ut
¡
cLt,
yLt
H
¢
, a contradiction given Ut ∈ U and 0 < L < H. ¤
Lemma 2 tells us that it cannot be optimal –according to the government’s program (∗)– to
treat the indistinguishable middle types LH and HL diﬀerently in case y∗HL ≤ L. Otherwise
(if y∗HL > L) it might be optimal to treat them diﬀerently, but only under certain conditions:
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Lemma 2. Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes represented
by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable mid-
dle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined by (∗). In an optimal
allocation x∗∈X , we must have:
(a). x∗LH = x
∗
HL, if y
∗
HL ≤ L, or else,
(b). VHL (x
∗
LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL) , with y
∗
LH = L < y
∗
HL and MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1.
Proof of part (a). Suppose y∗HL ≤ L and x∗LH 6= x∗HL. We show that it is always possible to
construct another allocation x ∈X , which is feasible, implementable and strictly better than
x∗ according to the government’s program (∗). Because y∗HL ≤ L, the incentive compatibility
constraints ICLH,HL and ICHL,LH require
VHL (x
∗
HL) ≥ VHL (x∗LH) and
VLH (x
∗
LH) ≥ VLH (x∗HL)⇔ VHL (x∗LH) ≥ VHL (x∗HL) ,
where the equivalence⇔ is due to indistinguishable middle types. We must have VHL (x∗HL) =
VHL (x
∗
LH), or x
∗
LH and x
∗
HL must lie on the same indiﬀerence curve.
Given our preference technology U , there are only two cases for x∗LH 6= x∗HL. Assume x∗LH <
x∗HL, i.e., c
∗
LH < c
∗
HL and y
∗
LH < y
∗
HL; for the other case x
∗
LH > x
∗
HL simply switch subscripts
HL and LH in the sequel. Define a bundle x◦ = (c◦, y◦) in R× [0, L] such that x◦ also lies on
the same indiﬀerence curve through x∗LH and x
∗
HL, i.e., VHL (x
◦) = VHL (x∗HL), and choose
(i) y◦ = 0, if MRSYHL ≥ 1 everywhere in R× [0, L], (ii) y◦ = L, if MRSYHL ≤ 1 everywhere
in R × [0, L], or else (iii) choose x◦ such that MRSYHL (x◦) = 1. Each case leads to any
of the following three cases: either (α) y◦ ≤ y∗LH < y∗HL, or (β) y∗LH < y◦ < y∗HL or (γ)
y∗LH < y
∗
HL ≤ y◦. In each of the three cases (α), (β) and (γ), it is possible to use trick 1, by
moving either x∗HL to the left on his indiﬀerence curve (in case (α) and (β)) or moving x
∗
LH
to the right on his indiﬀerence curve (in case (γ)), contradicting that x∗ was optimal.
Proof of part (b). Suppose y∗HL > L. We show that x
∗
LH < x
∗
HL, with y
∗
LH = L and
MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1, must hold. Recall that, in case y∗HL > L, the incentive constraint
ICLH,HL does not exist, because type HL’s bundle is not attainable for LH.
We first show that the incentive constraint ICHL,LH must bind, i.e., VHL (x
∗
HL) = VHL (x
∗
LH).
Suppose not, i.e., VHL (x
∗
HL) > VHL (x
∗
LH). Single-crossingness ensures that VHL (x
∗
HL) >
VHL (x
∗
LL) and thus LL is strictly worse-oﬀ compared to HL (lemma 1); for the same reason,
LH is strictly worse oﬀ compared to HH. Now, it is possible to use trick 2, transferring
from type HL (and possibly HH as well, if ICHL,HH binds) to both other types LL and LH,
which must improve the lowest well-being, contradicting that x∗ was optimal according to
program (∗).
Now, we are back in the same situation as in part (a), because both x∗LH and x
∗
HL, with
x∗LH < x
∗
HL, lie on the same indiﬀerence curve (of type HL), i.e., VHL (x
∗
LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL),
but here y∗LH ≤ L < y∗HL. Now proceed as in part (a). Define the bundle x◦ = (c◦, y◦) in
R × [0,H] such that x◦ also lies on the same indiﬀerence curve through x∗LH and x∗HL, i.e.,
VHL (x
◦) = VHL (x∗HL), and choose (i) y
◦ = 0, if MRSYHL ≥ 1 everywhere in R × [0,H],
(ii) y◦ = H, if MRSYHL ≤ 1 everywhere in R × [0,H], or else (iii) choose x◦ such that
MRSYHL (x
◦) = 1. Now, y◦ < y∗HL is not possible (otherwise we can use trick 1, moving
x∗HL to the left on his indiﬀerence curve); thus MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1. As a consequence
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y◦ ≥ y∗HL must hold. Now, y∗LH < L is not possible (because then y∗LH < L < y◦ and using
trick 1 again, we could move x∗LH to the right on his indiﬀerence curve). Thus y
∗
LH = L,
which completes the proof. ¤
We are ready to prove propositions 2 and 3, on the basis of lemmas 1 and 2 and tricks 1 and
2.
Proof of proposition 2
Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes represented by utility functions
UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable middle type. Consider a
government who optimizes the program defined by (∗). In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X , we
must have y∗LL − c∗LL ≥ y∗LH − c∗LH .
Our proof consists of two parts, depending on whether (a) y∗HL ≤ L in the optimum x∗, or
(b) y∗HL > L. Given the definition of X , one of both cases must hold. We show, for both
cases, that y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH is not possible.
Proof of part (a). Suppose y∗HL ≤ L (thus x∗LH = x∗HL via lemma 2) and y∗LL − c∗LL <
y∗LH − c∗LH . We consider four possible cases, depending on whether ICLL,LH and/or ICLH,LL
bind, or not. In an optimum x∗ of the program (∗), one of these four cases must hold. For
all cases, we show that it is possible to construct a strictly better allocation according to the
program (∗), which also satisfies the feasibility and incentive compatibility constraints.
1. ICLL,LH and ICLH,LL bind. This requires x
∗
LL = x
∗
LH which contradicts y
∗
LL − c∗LL <
y∗LH − c∗LH .
2. ICLL,LH binds, ICLH,LL does not bind. 2a. If MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) < 1, we could use
trick 1 moving x∗LL somewhat to the right on his indiﬀerence curve. 2b. We must have
MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) ≥ 1, from (2a). But, given the preference technology defined by U , y∗LL−c∗LL <
y∗LH − c∗LH is not possible, a contradiction.
3. ICLL,LH does not bind, ICLH,LL binds: 3a. Let us first focus on type LH. If y
∗
LH = 0, then
incentive constraints and single-crossingness require x∗LL = x
∗
LH , which violates y
∗
LL − c∗LL <
y∗LH − c∗LH . So y∗LH > 0. If MRSYLH (x∗LH) > 1, we can use trick 1 again, by moving both
x∗LH = x
∗
HL to the left on their (common) indiﬀerence curve. So MRSYLH (x
∗
LH) ≤ 1 must
hold. 3b. We focus now on type LL. We must have either (i) y∗LL = 0 or (ii) y
∗
LL > 0. In case
(ii), we have MRSYLH (x
∗
LH) ≤ 1 (otherwise we can use trick 1, moving x∗LH somewhat to
the left on his indiﬀerence curve). 3c. Due to lemma 1, either type LH or LL has the minimal
well-being. Figure A3 illustrates (3a), (3b(ii)) and y∗LL− c∗LL < y∗LH− c∗LH ; type HH’s bundle
is somewhere in the shaded zone. It is easy to verify that type LH is always strictly worse-oﬀ
compared to type LL, irrespective of the proportion of high-skilled nHL+nHHn (which defines
the kink in the budget set where the slope changes from HL > 1 to 1) and irrespective of
whether (3b(i)) or (3b(ii)) applies.
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Figure A3: type LL is strictly better oﬀ compared to type LH .
Since ICLL,LH does not bind, it is always possible to use trick 2 transferring a small amount
of money from LL to the other types LH, HL and HH, improving the minimal well-being
in society, a contradiction.
4. ICLL,LH and ICLH,LL do not bind. Using trick 1, it can be verified that only the following
cases are possible: (i) y∗LL = 0 < y
∗
LH , MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) ≥ 1 and MRSYLH (x∗LH) ≤ 1, or (ii)
0 < y∗LL < y
∗
LH , MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) = 1 and MRSYLH (x
∗
LH) ≤ 1. We are back in the same
situation as in (3). In both cases (i) and (ii) and, given y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH , type LH is
strictly worse-oﬀ compared to LL, irrespective of the proportion of high-skilled. Here again,
trick 2 can be used to obtain a contradiction.
Proof of part (b). Suppose y∗HL > L (thus VHL (x
∗
LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL), with y
∗
LH = L < y
∗
HL
and MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1 via lemma 2) and y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH . It is again possible
to consider four cases, depending on whether ICLL,LH and/or ICLH,LL bind or not, and to
show, for each case, a contradiction. Actually, the proof is completely analogous as in steps
1-4 of part (a) and therefore omitted.
Proof of proposition 3
Consider a four type economy with skills L = 0 < H and tastes represented by utility functions
UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable middle type. Consider a
government who optimizes the program defined by (∗). In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X we
must have y∗LL − c∗LL = y∗LH − c∗LH ≤ y∗HL − c∗HL.
Proof. Suppose y∗LL−c∗LL = y∗LH−c∗LH > y∗HL−c∗HL holds. 1. Because L = 0 and x∗ ∈ X , we
must have y∗LL = y
∗
LH = 0 and, given the incentive constraints, also c
∗
LL = c
∗
LH must hold. 2.
Due to lemma 1, the lowest well-being is either LH or LL, thus, given (1), we must maximize
the basic income, i.e., maximize c∗LL = c
∗
LH . 3. y
∗
HL = 0 is excluded, otherwise we must have
c∗LH = c
∗
HL (due to incentive constraints) and y
∗
LH − c∗LH > y∗HL − c∗HL would be violated. 4.
So, y∗HL > 0 holds from (3). Now, x
∗
LH and x
∗
HL must lie on the same indiﬀerence curve, or
VHL (x
∗
HL) = VHL (x
∗
LH). Otherwise (see the proof of lemma 2, part (b)) it would be possible
to improve the situation of the worst-oﬀ types LL and LH, at the cost of the better-oﬀ types
HL and HH (on the basis of trick 2). 5. If MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) > 1 at y
∗
HL > 0, we can use
trick 1, moving x∗HL to the left on his indiﬀerence curve. 6. To summarize, we must have
MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1 and y∗HL > 0 while VHL (x∗HL) = VHL (x∗LH) and y∗LH = 0. But this
contradicts y∗LH − c∗LH > y∗HL − c∗HL, given our preference technology defined by U .
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Appendix B: The Belgian tax system for singles
pre-tax income y marginal tax rate (in %)
< 5032 0
5033 — 6272 25
6273 — 8304 30
8305 — 11849 40
11850 — 27268 45
27269 — 40902 50
40903 — 59990 52.5
> 59990 55
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Appendix C: Imputation via a sample selection model
First, we present the variables used for imputing gross hourly wages σ and net hourly benefits
bh; afterwards, we show the estimates for both sample selection models.
Imputing gross hourly wages σ
In the wage equation, the independent variables are:
• age and its square (age, agesq)
• educational dummies indicating the highest achieved education level of the individ-
ual, starting from primary education (base case), lower secondary education (dume-
duc2 ), higher secondary education (dumeduc3 ), higher education short type (dume-
duc4 ), higher education long type (dumeduc5 )
• a gender dummy (sex) taking the value of 1 for females
In the selection equation, the independent variables are:
• physical health dummies indicating the general health situation of the individual, rang-
ing from very good (base case), good (dumhealth2 ), reasonable (dumhealth3 ), to bad
(dumhealth4 )
• mental health dummies indicating how often the individual feels depressed, ranging from
never (base case), seldom (dumdepri2 ), at times (dumdepri3 ), regularly (dumdepri4 ),
to frequently (dumdepri5 ); and how often the individual longs for death, ranging from
never (base case), seldom (dumdeath2 ), at times (dumdeath3 ), regularly (dumdeath4 ),
to frequently (dumdeath5 )
• smoking dummies indicating smoking behaviour, ranging from never (base case), occa-
sionally (dumsmoke2 ), to daily (dumsmoke3 )
• care dummies indicating whether the individual has to take care for his children (child)
taking the value of 1 if aﬃrmative; and/or has to take care of others (depperson) taking
the value of 1 if aﬃrmative
• the independent variables of the wage equation
Imputing net hourly benefits bh
The dependent variable is the marginal benefit per hour bh =
b
2925 , with b the net yearly
benefit. The independent variables are identical to those in the Heckman selection model
imputing σ. In addition, we add in both the benefit and the selection equation civil status
dummies, indicating whether the individual is divorced (divorce), taking the value of 1 if
aﬃrmative; widowed (widow), taking the value of 1 if aﬃrmative; living together (cohabit),
taking the value of 1 if aﬃrmative.
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Number of observations = 644, from which 136 censored and 508
uncensored. Wald’s χ2 (7) = 265.68 with Pr > χ2 (7) = 0.00 and
likelihood ratio test of independent wage and selection equations
results in χ2 (1) = 4.66 with Pr > χ2 (1) = 0.031.
wage equation Coeﬃcient Standard Error Pr > |z|
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
cons
0.497 0.123 0.000
-0.003 0.002 0.075
1.364 1.141 0.232
2.834 1.103 0.010
4.508 1.160 0.000
5.617 1.149 0.000
-0.917 0.383 0.017
-2.680 2.568 0.297
selection equation Coeﬃcient Standard Error Pr > |z|
dumhealth2
dumhealth3
dumhealth4
dumdepri2
dumdepri3
dumdepri4
dumdepri5
dumdeath2
dumdeath3
dumdeath4
dumdeath5
dumsmoke2
dumsmoke3
child
depperson
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
cons
-0.576 0.176 0.001
-0.686 0.227 0.002
-1.221 0.476 0.010
0.014 0.186 0.938
-0.243 0.185 0.188
-0.486 0.249 0.051
-0.799 0.342 0.019
0.374 0.173 0.031
0.113 0.196 0.563
0.160 0.297 0.591
-0.657 0.352 0.062
-0.041 0.245 0.868
-0.219 0.138 0.114
-0.355 0.153 0.020
-0.232 0.210 0.269
0.179 0.040 0.000
-0.002 0.001 0.000
0.587 0.254 0.021
0.784 0.243 0.001
1.584 0.305 0.000
1.685 0.291 0.000
-0.507 0.139 0.000
-2.016 0.728 0.006
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Number of observations = 638, from which 480 censored and 158
uncensored. Wald’s χ2 (10) = 50.51 with Pr > χ2 (7) = 0.00 and
likelihood ratio test of independent benefit and selection equations
results in χ2 (1) = 7.09 with Pr > χ2 (1) = 0.008.
benefit equation Coeﬃcient Standard Error Pr > |z|
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
divorce
widow
cohabit
cons
0.115 0.051 0.025
-0.001 0.001 0.120
0.361 0.259 0.163
0.470 0.271 0.083
0.181 0.358 0.613
0.575 0.410 0.161
-0.317 0.187 0.091
0.376 0.197 0.057
-0.504 0.582 0.386
-0.035 0.196 0.858
-0.226 0.921 0.806
selection equation Coeﬃcient Standard Error Pr > |z|
dumhealth2
dumhealth3
dumhealth4
dumdepri2
dumdepri3
dumdepri4
dumdepri5
dumdeath2
dumdeath3
dumdeath4
dumdeath5
dumsmoke2
dumsmoke3
child
depperson
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
divorce
widow
cohabit
cons
0.304 0.154 0.048
0.416 0.203 0.040
0.384 0.415 0.355
0.137 0.163 0.400
0.244 0.166 0.142
0.470 0.237 0.048
0.334 0.329 0.311
-0.464 0.154 0.003
0.020 0.173 0.909
0.369 0.254 0.145
0.889 0.339 0.009
0.114 0.214 0.596
0.228 0.124 0.065
0.304 0.143 0.033
0.158 0.192 0.410
-0.108 0.040 0.007
0.001 0.001 0.006
-0.376 0.242 0.120
-0.707 0.232 0.002
-1.049 0.265 0.000
-1.428 0.270 0.000
0.373 0.128 0.004
0.027 0.162 0.868
0.036 0.490 0.941
-0.329 0.144 0.022
1.247 0.717 0.082
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Appendix D: Some descriptive statistics
We report the number of observations (n), the minimum (min), the 25th percentile (p25), the
median (p50), the 75th percentile (p75) and the maximum (max) for the following variables:
age, normalized labour `, observed gross hourly wages σ, imputed gross hourly wages σˆ,
observed and imputed gross hourly wages (σ, σˆ), observed net hourly benefits bh, imputed
net hourly benefits bˆh and observed and imputed net hourly benefits (bh, bˆh).
n min p25 p50 p75 max
age 621 16 25 33 42 70
` 621 0.000 0.231 0.554 0.615 1.000
σ 502 1.495 9.585 11.864 15.700 38.271
σˆ 119 1.262 4.796 6.665 9.421 19.214
σ, σˆ 621 1.262 8.594 11.065 14.404 38.271
bh 143 0.166 0.915 1.849 3.051 3.661
bˆh 478 0.002 0.072 0.214 0.510 2.089
bh, bˆh 621 0.002 0.115 0.345 0.928 3.661
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